The link below is clear evidence of the fact that this country no longer operates with the bounds of the Constitution in place. We had better wake up soon to the reality that will not go away. The BAR is evil and ANYONE!!!!!!!! who will not recognize your right to be a natural man with no obligation the "state" is part of the problem, not part of the solution. If you know a judge personally as an acquaintance or even as a good friend, talk to him and see if he can understand what you mean when you say "legal fiction" or "natural man". See if he has even heard of registering with the BAR or the evil they represent and how to be a Constitutional judge. See if you can make him understand what Terry Trussel could not.
Do you think this is about failure to appear?
I am the Ohio state coordinator and Fairfield Co organizer... I have posted all over the NLA site about the evilness in the courts.. http://www.meetup.com/NationalLibertyAlliance/messages/boards/threa...
nobody has seen as much as I have.... I don't care what they say.. and it just continues when I sit on all the DOCUMENTED evidence I have...
I post all over the place. http://www.meetup.com/NationalLibertyAlliance/members/99172092/
I am tired of writing and posting and making timelines and then people tell me to do it all over again.... I am tired I am tired I am tired. Why can't people just read what I post the first time like I do for others???? I always hear people are too busy.
Is your court a court of record?
My court is theirs is NOT....
It doesn't matter when they have the agents with the costumes, badges and guns on their side.... It's tyranny as usual.
Amazing isn't it.. that if anybody really sits down and reads the grievances in the the Declaration of Independence what is different today?????
So Rosanna, how is the "Common Law Grand Jury" in Ohio doing? Surely, given your situation, it would have reached some consensus?
Oh my Rosanna, the Topix forum on Bellefountaine shows a lovely family quibble. Now I understand even better the judges words.
Just some spare time research on common law
New Jersey -
2C:1-5. Abolition of common law crimes; all offenses defined by statute; application of general provisions of the code; limitation of local government laws? a. Common law crimes are abolished and no conduct constitutes an offense unless the offense is defined by this code or another statute of this State.
939.10 Common law crimes abolished; common law rules preserved. Common law crimes are abolished. The common law rules of criminal law not in conflict with chs. 939 to 951 are preserved.
Common law crimes are abolished and no conduct is a crime unless made so by this code, other applicable statute or ordinance.
500.020 Offenses defined by statute -- Common law abolished.
(1) Common law offenses are abolished and no act or omission shall constitute a
criminal offense unless designated a crime or violation under this code or
another statute of this state.
I have been looking at your case and although I have not found the audio yet, I did find a 2010 Court of Appeals of Ohio ruling
Where the court affirmed the lower court's ruling.
The issue involves the death of a mother, the executor of the will, Clair who was assigned as such by the will:
I hereby nominate and appoint Clair R. Miller as my Personal Representative under this, my Last Will. If for any reason such person fails to qualify, or is unable or unwilling to serve as my Personal Representative, I nominate and appoint Rosanna L. Miller as my Personal Representative.
Also a Supreme Court of Ohio Ruling
Petitioner-appellant, Rosanna Miller, brings this appeal from the judgment of the Family Court of Logan County, Probate Division, denying her petition to have her father, Clair R. Miller, found to be incompetent. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
The next witness presented was Dr. Stoltzfus. Dr. Stoltzfus testified that he administered a mini-assessment of mental status to Clair. Clair scored 27 out of 28 points, which is within the normal range and would not result in a clinical diagnosis of dementia
In your recent case, a warrant for your arrest was issued for failure to appear. You had not filed a proper filing of an affidavit of indigency.
The Judge is making a lot of effort to help you move forward and did not hold you in contempt, accepting your explanation.
You are lucky to have an understanding judge.
The unconstitutional judge (she is issuing warrants for court costs and we don't have debtors prison) held a TRIAL on me while I stood outside the bar and she forbid me to be a part of the trial...
Again this has nothing to do with debtor prison but rather an order to pay cost, which is perfectly lawful. It does not really matter if you stand outside the bar, or inside, that's another myth that is not going to help you, as you may have found out.
then she found me guilty in that case with NO victim and the complaints were ILLEGAL....
There need not be a 'victim' for something to be a crime. Speeding is a good example. As to complaints being illegal, that is for the judge to decide, not for you to claim. If she was wrong, you can appeal.
Native Born Citizen,
You need to go to www.nationallibertyalliance and find out about the Common Law Grand Jury.Your example of speeding is wrong. In order for there to be a crime their needs to be an injured party or "victim", if there is no injured party/victim, there is no crime. In the case of speeding, jaywalking, driving without a license, among enumerable others, where is the injured party/victim? And the State cannot be the injured party/victim. The courts use Admiralty Law, not the correct and Constitutional Common Law.
I understand that the NLA is arguing, and yet there is no foundation for the claim that there has to be an 'injured party' or 'victim' for there to be a crime and that the state cannot be the injured party. In fact, the State represents 'we the people' when prosecuting such 'victimless crimes'. It's a myth that crimes require a victim.
No admiralty law is being used, again a common myth that has been rejected by countless courts.
Educate yourself, and do the research. It makes such a difference.
I am looking forward to some supported arguments.
Finally, Defendant Greenstreet's response to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment identifies this Court as an "Admiralty Court" without further discussing his allegation. If his reference is to be construed as a jurisdictional challenge, his motion is denied. Others have attempted to persuade the judiciary that fringe on an American flag denotes a court of admiralty. In light of the fact that this Court has such a flag in its courtroom, the issue is addressed. The concept behind the theory the proponent asserts is that if a courtroom is adorned with a flag which happens to be fringed around the edges, such decor indicates that the court is one of admiralty jurisdiction exclusively. To think that a fringed flag adorning the courtroom somehow limits this Court's jurisdiction is frivolous. See Vella v. McCammon, 671 F.Supp. 1128, 1129 (S.D.Tex.1987) (describing petitioner's claim that court lacked jurisdiction because flag was fringed as "without merit" and "totally frivolous"). Unfortunately for Defendant Greenstreet, decor is not a determinant for jurisdiction.US v. Greenstreet, 912 F. Supp. 224 - Dist. Court, ND Texas 1996Kitchens' contention that the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas is a "vice admiralty court" which exercises "military jurisdiction" is patently frivolous and has been rejected in every forum in which it has been raised. See, e.g., Larson v. Carlson, civil action no. 09-3070, 2010 WL 1576829 (D.Minn., April 20, 2010) (stating that challenge to the court's "de facto admiralty jurisdiction" and seeking the removal of "the de facto flag of war of the United States Corporation" is frivolous and warrants no further discussion); Minkin v. U.S., civil action no. 05-cv-1255, 2006 WL 1174318 (N.D.N.Y., May 3, 2006) (rejecting challenge to court's "admiralty/maritime jurisdiction" as "bordering on the absurd").Kitchens v. Becraft, Dist. Court, ED Texas 2011
In the alternative, Mr. Blackburn argues that this Court is an admiralty court and has no jurisdiction to hear the current case. Article II, Section 2 of the United States Constitution grants original jurisdiction to United States federal courts over admiralty and maritime matters. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2. Furthermore, Title 28 of the United States Code provides:The district courts have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled. (2) Any prize brought into the United States and all proceedings for the condemnation of property taken as prize.
28 U.S.C. § 1333. The general doctrine of maritime law dictates that in contract matters, admiralty jurisdiction depends on the nature of the transaction and in tort matters upon the locality. Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469, 476 (1922). The case at hand is non-maritime, as it does not involve any incident occurring on navigable waters or activities related to navigation or commerce. Id.at 475-76. Furthermore, contract and tort law are not involved. Admiralty law, therefore, is not applicable to this case.US v. Blackburn, Dist. Court, D. Kansas 2010
In recent years, a conspiracy argument used by tax protesters is that an American court displaying an American flag with a gold fringe is in fact an "admiralty court" and thus has nojurisdiction. Courts have repeatedly dismissed this as frivolous. Nevertheless, practice rules in most court require any challenges to jurisdiction to be made immediately before other pleadings. Any courts can rule on any various issue, including maritime or admiralty if applicable to the claimants. If a successful challenge to a criminal prosecution under admiralty jurisdiction were to be made, the matter would be dismissed before any plea could be entered.
 cites US v. Mackovich, 209 F. 3d 1227 - Court of Appeals, 10th Circuit 2000
See also Joyner v. Borough of Brooklyn, No. 98 CV 2579 (RJD), 1999 WL 294780, at *1, *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 1999) (holding that "[t]he yellow fringe trim on the American flag has no effect on a court's jurisdiction or a defendant's constitutional or statutory rights"); Cass v. Richard Joshua Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 1:97CV01236, 1998 WL 834856, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 1, 1998) (rejecting the "phantasmal" claim that flags adorned with fringe are "instrumentalities of a foreign sovereign" and noting that "[f]ringed flagged jurisprudence flourishes, though frequently found frivolous"); United States v. Warren, No. 91-CR-226, 1998 WL 26406, at *1-*2 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 1998) (restating the plaintiff's position that a "foreign yellow fringe flag" is illegal and concluding that "one could rightly call" such an argument "gibberish"); Sadlier v. Payne, 974 F. Supp. 1411, 1415-16 (D. Utah 1997) (repudiating a plaintiff's claim that "yellow fringe on the flag somehow converted the jurisdiction of the state court into a 'foreign state/power'"); Schneider v. Schlaefer, 975 F. Supp. 1160, 1161-64 & n.1 (E.D. Wis. 1997) (noting a plaintiff's attempt to invoke "Army Regulation 840-10" and stating that "flag fringe" jargon is "regrettably familiar to . . . federal courts around the country"); McCann v. Greenway, 952 F. Supp. 647, 649-51 (W.D. Mo. 1997) (discussing army regulations and holding that "[e]ven if the Army or Navy do display United States flags surrounded by yellow fringe, the presence of yellow fringe does not necessarily turn every such flag into a flag of war"); United States v. Greenstreet, 912 F. Supp. 224, 229 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (recognizing that a number of litigants have "attempted to persuade the judiciary that fringe on an American flag denotes a court of admiralty" and thereby limits federal jurisdiction); United States v. Schiefen, 926 F. Supp. 877, 884 (D.S.D. 1995) (concluding that "[f]ederal jurisdiction is determined by statute, not by whether the flag flown is plain or fringed"); Vella v. McCammon, 671 F. Supp. 1128, 1129 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (rebuffing as "totally frivolous" the argument that a court lacks jurisdiction because "[a] flag has yellow fringes on it").