Constitution of the State of California, 1849
Article I: Declaration of Rights
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The United States Supreme Court has identified three categories of police contact with
persons. The first is referred to as a "consensual encounter" in which there is no restraint
on the person's liberty. There need be no objective justification for such an encounter.
The second type, called "detention," involves a seizure of the individual for a limited duration
and for limited purposes. A constitutionally acceptable detention can occur "if there is an articulable
suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime." The third type involves seizures
in the nature of an arrest, which may occur only if the police have probable cause to arrest the person
for a crime. (Florida v. Royer, supra, 460 U.S. 491; Wilson v. Superior Court, supra, 34 Cal.3d 777.)
PEOPLE v. BAILEY, 176 Cal.App.3d 402
[No. H000583. Court of Appeals of California, Sixth Appellate District. December 17,1985.]
"SHOW OF AUTHORITY"
 The federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreasonable
seizures. Our state Constitution includes a similar prohibition. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13.) "A seizure occurs whenever a police officer 'by means
of physical force or show of authority' restrains the liberty of a person to walk away." (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 229, quoting
Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 19, fn. 16.) Whether a seizure has taken place is to be determined by an objective test, which asks "not
whether the citizen perceived that he was being ordered to restrict his movement, but whether the officer's words and actions would
have conveyed that to a reasonable person." (California v. Hodari D. (1999) 499 U.S. 621, 628.) Thus, when police engage in conduct
that would "communicate to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business," there
has been a seizure. (Kaupp v. Texas (2003) 538 U.S. 626, 629; Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 437.)
When the seizure of a person amounts to an arrest, it must be supported by an arrest warrant or by probable cause. (Kaupp v. Texas, supra,
538 U.S. at p. 630.) Probable cause exists when the facts known to the arresting officer would persuade someone of "reasonable caution"
that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. (Dunaway v. New York (1979) 442 U.S. 200, 208, fn. 9.)
In Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. 1, the United States Supreme Court created a limited exception that allows police officers to "stop and . . .
frisk for weapons" when they have an "articulable suspicion [the] person has committed or is about to commit a crime." (Florida v.
Royer, supra, at p. 498.)  Thus, an officer who lacks probable cause to arrest can conduct a brief investigative detention when there is
" 'some objective manifestation' that criminal activity is afoot and that the person to be stopped is engaged in that activity." (People v.
Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 230; see also United States v. Cortez (1981) 449 U.S. 411, 417.) Because an investigative detention allows
the police to ascertain whether suspicious conduct is criminal activity, such a detention "must be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." (Florida v. Royer, supra, at p. 500; see also Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d
777, 784 [describing a detention as limited in "duration, scope and purpose"].)
The distinction between a detention and an arrest "may in some instances create difficult line-drawing problems." (United States v. Sharpe
(1985) 470 U.S. 675, 685; see also United States v. Torres-Sanchez (9th Cir. 1996) 83 F.3d 1123, 1127 [there is no " 'bright-line for
determining when an investigatory stop crosses the line and becomes an arrest' "].)  This much is clear: A brief stop and pat-down of
someone suspected of criminal activity is merely an investigative detention requiring no more than a reasonable suspicion. (Terry v.
Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at pp. 6-7.)
People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667
 The basic premise behind "consensual encounters" is that a citizen may consent voluntarily to official intrusions upon interests protected
by the Constitution. If the citizen acts in reasonable submission to a show of authority, then his actions are not voluntary or consensual.
Where consensual, consent may be withdrawn at any time. (People v.Gurtenstein (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 441 , 451 [138 Cal.Rptr. 161].)
The citizen participant in a consensual encounter may leave, refuse to answer questions or decline to act in the manner requested by the authorities.
...if the manner in which the request was made constituted a show of authority such that appellant reasonably might believe he had to comply,
then the encounter was transformed into a detention.
People v. Franklin , 192 Cal.App.3d 935
"SHOW OF AUTHORITY"
...evidence also supports the conclusion Ms. Spicer's freedom of movement was restrained by a show of authority. (Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 553 [64 L.Ed.2d at p. 508];Royer, supra, 460 U.S. at p. 501 [75 L.Ed.2d at p. 239, 103 S.Ct. at p. 1326];In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888 , 895 [148 Cal.Rptr. 366, 582 P.2d 957].) She was confronted by a uniformed officer almost immediately after the car in which she was riding was stopped. Without any explanation or prefatory remarks, the officer requested her driver's license.
The nature of the questions asked by the officer during a contact are also relevant to the seizure issue. (SeeWilson, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 790-791;Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 554.) An unequivocal verbal command is far more likely to produce the perception of restricted liberty than a mere approach (People v. Jones (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 820 , 825-826 [158 Cal.Rptr. 415]), casual banter (People v. Warren, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d at p. 996), or an ambiguous statement which could be either a command or a request. (People v. King (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 346 , 349-350 [139 Cal.Rptr. 926].) Furthermore, "'a reasonable person might read an officer's "May I" as the courteous expression of a demand backed by force of law.'" (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 289 [36 L.Ed.2d 854, 898, 93 S.Ct. 2041], Marshall, J., dis.) The attitude expressed by Ms. Spicer toward the police is credible and almost certainly typical. She testified, "I just felt like if a policeman should ever stop me if he wants my purse he will ask me. If he asks me to get out of car I am coming out with [my] hands free. I have read too many people getting shot these days by policemen who thought ...." fn. 3
It is especially pertinent to this case that the officer did not explain to Ms. Spicer his reason for requesting her driver's license. In People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99 , 118 [137 Cal.Rptr. 447, 561 P.2d 1135], our Supreme Court stated, "While we reject an absolute requirement of a warning of the right to refuse permission as a precondition to a consent search, we do not intend to discourage the giving of such advice in appropriate cases. In view of the settled rule that the lack of such a warning is a factor to be taken into account in applying the totality of the circumstances test [citations omitted], the police would be well advised in close cases to 'make a record' by expressly giving the admonition ...." In Mendenhall the majority found that knowledge of the right to refuse a search request was "highly relevant" to the determination that there had been consent.(446 U.S. at pp. 558-559 [64 [157 Cal.App.3d 220] L.Ed.2d at pp. 512-513].) Where, as here, the circumstances are pregnant with coercion, an admonition along the lines mentioned in James was called for.
PEOPLE v. SPICER , 157 Cal.App.3d 213
[Crim. No. 45072. Court of Appeals of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven. June 15, 1984.]
"SHOW OF AUTHORITY" IN RELATION TO SO-CALLED "TRAFFIC STOPS"
"...an officer may be held liable in damages to any person injured in consequence of a breach of any of the duties connected with his
office... The liability for nonfeasance, misfeasance, and for malfeasance in office is in his 'individual', not his official capacity..."
70 Am. Jur. 2nd Sec. 50, VII Civil Liability
Personal liberty, which is guaranteed to every citizen under our constitution and laws, consists of the right to locomotion,- to go where one pleases, and when, and to do that which may lead to one's business or pleasure, only restrained as the rights to others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. One may travel along the public highways or in public places; and while conducting themselves in a decent and orderly manner, disturbing no other, and interfering with the rights of no other citizens, there, they will be protected under law, not onlytheir persons, but in their safe conduct.The constitution and the laws are framed for the public good, and the protection of all citizens from the highest to the lowest; and no one may be restrained of his liberty, unless he transgressed some law. Any law which would place the keeping and safe conduct of another in the hands of even a conservator of the peace, unless for some breach of the peace committed in his presence, or upon suspicion of felony, would be most oppressive and unjust, and destroy all rights which our constitution guarantees.
Pinkerton v. Verberg 99 S.Ct. 2627 (1979)
"The privilege against self-incrimination is neither accorded to the passive resistant, nor the person who is ignorant of his rights, nor to one indifferent thereto. It is a fighting clause. Its benefits can be retained only by sustained combat. It cannot be claimed by an attorney or solicitor. It is valid only when insisted upon by a belligerent claimant in person."
U.S. v Johnson, 76 F. Supp 538
Our holding today is based exclusively on article I, section 13, of the California Constitution, which requires a more exacting standard for cases arising within this state.
In Cooper v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 58, 62 [17 L.Ed.2d 730, 734, 87 S.Ct. 788], the Supreme Court recognized this well-known principle: "Our holding, of course, does not affect the State's power to impose higher standards on searches and seizures than required by the Federal Constitution if it chooses to do so."
In short, the Supreme Court has clearly recognized that state courts are the ultimate arbiters of state law,...
This court has always assumed the independent vitality of our state Constitution.
Thus in [13 Cal.3d 551] determining that California citizens are entitled to greater protection under the California Constitution against unreasonable searches and seizures than that required by the United States Constitution, we are embarking on no revolutionary course. Rather we are simply reaffirming a basic principle of federalism -- that the nation as a whole is composed of distinct geographical and political entities bound together by a fundamental federal law but nonetheless independently responsible for safeguarding the rights of their citizens.
"Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution."
People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal.3d 528
[Crim. No. 16520. Supreme Court of California. February 20, 1975.]
...under the California Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13) the evidence seized was the product of an unlawful search. We agree, and conclude the judgment must be reversed.
...the established rule that it is the People, rather than the defendant, who bear the burden of justifying a warrantless seizure. (Badillo v. Superior Court (1956) 46 Cal.2d 269, 272 [294 P.2d 23].)
Of course, our past decisions do clearly affirm that, while not controlling, the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of similar provisions of the federal Constitution, like our sister state courts' interpretations of similar state constitutional provisions, will provide valuable guidance in the interpretation of our state constitutional guarantees. (See, e.g., Gay Law Students Assn. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 458, 469 [156 Cal.Rptr. 14, 595 P.2d 592]; Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, supra, 12 Cal.2d 85, 89.)
People v. Longwill, 14 Cal.3d 943
[Crim. No. 17773. Supreme Court of California. August 7, 1975.]
Article I, section 15 of the California Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant's right "to have the assistance of counsel for the defendant's defense." (See also U.S. Const., 6th Amend.)
This conclusion, of course, simply reflects one of the principal tenets of our federal system of government: just as the United States Supreme Court bears the ultimate judicial responsibility for determining matters of federal law, this court bears the ultimate judicial responsibility for resolving questions of state law, including the proper interpretation of provisions of the state Constitution. (See generally Falk, The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground (1973) 61 Cal.L.Rev. 273; Note, State Bills of Rights (1973) 8 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ.Lib.L.Rev. 271, 285-286.) In fulfilling this difficult and grave responsibility, we cannot properly relegate our task to the judicial guardians of the federal Constitution, but instead must recognize our personal obligation to exercise independent legal judgment in ascertaining the meaning and application of state constitutional provisions.
People v. Chavez, 26 Cal.3d 334
[Crim. No. 20673. Supreme Court of California. January 29, 1980.]
It is settled that the streets of a city belong to the people of a state and the use thereof is an inalienable right of every citizen
of the state.
Whyte v. City of Sacramento, 65 Cal. App. 534, 547, (1924)
Escobedo v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal.2d 870 (1950)
THIS BUILDING IS WHERE A CORPORATION CONDUCTS IT'S BUSINESS
THIS IS WHERE SERVANTS EMPLOYED BY THE CORPORATION WORK
THE CORPORATE CHARTER FOR THIS CORPORATION IS
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
WHICH IN TURN APPLIES TO THE EMPLOYEES AND RESTRICTS THEIR CONDUCT
"Municipal authorities, as trustees for the public, ..."
Pittsford v. City of Los Angeles, 50 Cal.App.2d 25
[Civ. No. 13391. Second Dist., Div. One. Feb. 17, 1942.]
CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT CODE