AND IMPORTANT LEGAL INFORMATION FOR VICTIMS
Is it possible that people may become so accustomed to being victimized that they will actually resist efforts to stop organized criminal activity by which they are being abused? Will the traveling public of Oregon and the sister states allow and facilitate their own victimization under the guise of “public policy”, as manifested in contemporary “traffic enforecment”? Amazing preliminary results from a number of polls of actual victims, document a significant opposition to moving against those who victimize all who use the Public Right of Way today. Psychologists have studied the phenomenon of victim syndrome and recognize it as a common human frailty cross culturally and throughout time.
Crime is a dynamic that requires doers and those who wil be done unto. The corporate community lives and thrives for one reason only, and yes, it is intended that corporations be implicated as criminals herein. Corporations effectively play to the pathology of the human society within which they function. In addition to victim’s syndorme, human pathology includes ignorance, self absorption, sloth, and gluttony (not even real greed, just an insatiable desire to consume). The profile of today’s American consumer, characterized by these various pathologies, provides a major incentive to those with criminal proclivities to take financial advantage of society generally.
The essay presented here, isw written with the hope that when enough people decide they will be responsible for ending their own victimization, perhaps this guide to Oregon’s criminal code will be of assistance in formulating a basis for their effective action.
“The law” is a mysterious thing to many people in American society today. This is a relatively recent phenomenon. In former good times, when people didn’t have televisions to go home and watch, they went to the local pub and frequently amused themselves in contemplation of “the law”. In bygone eras, those who enjoyed this social activity were referred to generically as “lawyers”, a distinctly different group from the class of professionals we call “attorneys” today. In contemporary society, attorneys are considered priests of the law. Because the law has been lost to television, we, who are no longer “lawyers”, now go to the law through a bar member of the attorney priesthood.
Throughout this literary endeavor, the writer will refer to himself as a “code talker”. A code talker here, means someone who is familiar with a number of sections of “codified law”, and when visiting with fellow code talkers will frequently use code reference numbers as a convenient alternative to complete ideas that have been “encoded” into statute. It is a common perception that the word “code“ connotes something hidden. Please know that “code” can mean any system employed to convey concepts and connect people in communication, whether such communication is intended to be obscured from adversaries or not. Talking code can make a significant conversation more lively among those who are literate in the law. This compilation may encourage a new generation of “lawyers” to try a little code talking.
“The law”, as most us of us think of it today, is a compilation of bodies of law or “Acts” of the Legislative Assembly, having to do, primarily with the regulation of “persons”, such as doctors, architects, landscapers and other professionals, but also government and subdivisions thereof. In order to organize these bodies of law, they are numbered as “Titles” which are set out in chapters in a volume of “code”, a term that may properly be used interchangeably with “statutes”. The paragraphs, or sections of a chapter of code are numbered for convenient user access. This work will deal with Oregon’s Revised Statutes, which will be subsequently referred to as “ORS”.
As of 2009 the ORS consists of 17 Volumes, plus alphabetical index and annotations. Annotations are brief quotations from judicial opinions on the application of a particular section, but also include Attorney General Opinions. Volumes are composed of various Titles. Every section of ORS is referred to beginning with the chapter number. The chapter number will be followed by a decimal point and behind the “.”, will be the “paragraph” or “section” number, always a three digit number, except in the chapters of “Commercial Code” which have a life and existence far beyond the ORS (the Uniform Commercial Code has four digit section numbers). “Section numbers are in numerical order, frequently with .010 as the first paragraph of a chapter, but not necessarily consecutively numbered. Some numbers are routinely left available by the code reviser, or in Oregon, “Legislative Counsel”, for “expansion”, by subsequent “amendatory enactments” that add related details. A paragraph or section is headed by a phrase created by Legislative Counsel, the legislature’s attorney, or collectively, the “Office of Legislative Counsel”, called the “short title”. The short tile appears as bold faced print following the chapter and section number. The short title is NOT part of the law encoded in the section that follows. A section may be broken down into subsections in outline form for easy reference. A section ends with a series of abbreviations and numbers in smaller font known as the “legislative history”. The legislative history refers to the “enactments” of the Legislative Assembly, set forth by session year, chapter of the session’s laws, numbered consecutively by vote taken, and section of the chapter, from which the statute is derived.
The Oregon Revised Statutes from 161.205 to 161.255 describe circumstances giving rise to lawful use of force. Several of these sections are presented herewith for your consideration. Also "copy and pasted" for your consideration, are code sections that illuminate a common crime scenario today, which will only be stopped when sufficient numbers of citizens are willing exercise their right to effect arrests using the force described in ORS chapter 161, which includes “any force necessary”, as a routine matter of course. The "short title" of a couple of the following sections have been added to for the purpose of enhancing the focus, but they have not been "abridged" (had words deleted), the additions will appear in italics. In any event, the "short title" (text in bold faced print) is NOT the law, but only inserted in the statutes for handy reference.
In two sections, terms were substituted to achieve clarity. It is the considered opinion of this code talker, that no one will notice the substitutions, unless he of she is steeped in these particular sections on a week to week basis. Even if someone did pick out the substituted terms, no argument will be made of material alteration (This code talker would be extremely gratified to find someone who can identify the substituted terms, which would imply a capacity for more intimate levels of discourse in regard to this material).
In a number of sections, subsections unnecessary to the illustration intended by this compilation have been omitted. A sentence inserted contrary to best drafting practices, for the sole purpose of distracting the reader from the crucial nature of the sentence that followed, was omitted from ORS 153.039. The excised sentence was improperly inserted in the section, inasmuch as it is “redundant", and in view of the sentence that follows, "void for vagueness” as well. In other words, 153.039, as presented here, reads most concisely and more precisely conveys the legislative intent.
The selected sections have been "highlighted" and edited to focus the reader's attention on important portions of statute, however, the reader is advised to read the whole sections in order to most fully apprehend the intent of the legislation. Frequently, by employing the "filter" of "important" the entire section has been highlighted. By carefully reading the following sections, and hopefully many other statutes adjoining them, particularly the use of force laws and citizen's arrest (most of which are NOT included here), the reader will come to a new level of consciousness about who possesses "power" and where "delegated authority" comes from.
The pen is mightier than the sword..., if you also happen to own a sword..., but without proper attitude, owning a sword means little.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
In order to read any statute, the reader must understand that they are “constructed” in accordance with rules, many of which are found in ORS Chapter 174.
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES
174.010 General rule for construction of statutes. In the construction of a statute, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is, in terms or in substance, contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted; and where there are several provisions or particulars such construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.
174.020 Legislative intent; general and particular provisions; consideration of legislative history. (1)(a) In the construction of a statute, a court shall pursue the intention of the legislature if possible.
(b) To assist a court in its construction of a statute, a party may offer the legislative history of the statute.
(2) When a general and particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former so that a particular intent controls a general intent that is inconsistent with the particular intent.
(3) A court may limit its consideration of legislative history to the information that the parties provide to the court. A court shall give the weight to the legislative history that the court considers to be appropriate. [Amended by 2001 c.438 §1]
174.030 Construction favoring natural right to prevail. Where a statute is equally susceptible of two interpretations, one in favor of natural right and the other against it, the former is to prevail.
174.100 Definitions. As used in the statute laws of this state, unless the context or a specially applicable definition requires otherwise:
(1) “Any other state” includes any state and the District of Columbia.
(2) “City” includes any incorporated village or town.
(3) “County court” includes board of county commissioners.
(4) “May not” and “shall not” are equivalent expressions of an absolute prohibition.
(5) “Person” includes individuals, corporations, associations, firms, partnerships, limited liability companies and joint stock companies.
(6) “Sexual orientation” means an individual’s actual or perceived heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality or gender identity, regardless of whether the individual’s gender identity, appearance, expression or behavior differs from that traditionally associated with the individual’s sex at birth.
(7) “State Treasury” includes those financial assets the lawful custody of which are vested in the State Treasurer and the office of the State Treasurer relating to the custody of those financial assets.
(8) “To” means “to and including” when used in a reference to a series of statute sections, subsections or paragraphs.
(9) “United States” includes territories, outlying possessions and the District of Columbia.
(10) “Violate” includes failure to comply. [Amended by 1953 c.145 §2; 1957 c.360 §1; 1963 c.213 §1; 1965 c.518 §1; 1967 c.409 §1; 1983 c.327 §1; 1993 c.73 §1; 1995 c.93 §30; 2001 c.671 §1; 2007 c.100 §1]
NOTE: In subsection 5 above, the reader must understand that the term “individual” can not mean a single blade of grass or one book on a shelf. The term “individual” is completely dependant on the context from which it is drawn. In this case, “individual” is drawn from a listing of entities formed for the purpose of conducting business. Therefore the term may well be understood to mean a “sole proprietor”. If you have doubts as to the meaning of any words not defined in statute, they should be understood to have the meaning as defined in Webster’s New International Dictionary from an edition appropriate to the enactment of the section. This dictionary is the Oregon Legislature’s “official guide to common English language”, but is likely regarded similarly by your state legislature, where ever you, the reader, may live.
NOTE: In the next section of Oregon Revised Statutes, there can be no question that the public is “in lawful possession or control of” public property, including their courthouses, notwithstanding the normal practice of delegating such control to public servants. The information presented here, challenges the reader to go beyond conventional conceptions of reality that have been carefully engendered by social engineers and just read the words of the statutes as they have been written…
161.205 Use of physical force generally. The use of physical force upon another person that would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal under any of the following circumstances:
(1) A parent, guardian or other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a minor or an incompetent person may use reasonable physical force upon such minor or incompetent person when and to the extent the person reasonably believes it necessary to maintain discipline or to promote the welfare of the minor or incompetent person. A teacher may use reasonable physical force upon a student when and to the extent the teacher reasonably believes it necessary to maintain order in the school or classroom or at a school activity or event, whether or not it is held on school property.
(2) An authorized official of a jail, prison or correctional facility may use physical force when and to the extent that the official reasonably believes it necessary to maintain order and discipline or as is authorized by law.
(3) A person responsible for the maintenance of order in a common carrier of passengers, or a person acting under the direction of the person, may use physical force when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes it necessary to maintain order, but the person may use deadly physical force only when the person reasonably believes it necessary to prevent death or serious physical injury.
(4) A person acting under a reasonable belief that another person is about to commit suicide or to inflict serious physical self-injury may use physical force upon that person to the extent that the person reasonably believes it necessary to thwart the result.
(5) A person may use physical force upon another person in self-defense or in defending a third person, in defending property, in making an arrest or in preventing an escape, as hereafter prescribed in chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971. [1971 c.743 §21; 1981 c.246 §1]
161.219 Limitations on use of deadly physical force in defense of a person. Notwithstanding the provisions of ORS 161.209, a person is not justified in using deadly physical force upon another person unless the person reasonably believes that the other person is:
(1) Committing or attempting to commit a felony involving the use or threatened imminent use of physical force against a person; or
(2) Committing or attempting to commit a burglary in a dwelling; or
(3) Using or about to use unlawful deadly physical force against a person. [1971 c.743 §23]
NOTE: While reading this compilation, the reader must bear in mind that cops carry instruments of deadly force commonly known as “guns” and that they are trained in the use of deadly force for only one reason.
161.225 Use of physical force in defense of premises. (1) A person in lawful possession or control of premises is justified in using physical force upon another person when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes it necessary to prevent or terminate what the person reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted commission of a criminal trespass by the other person in or upon the premises.
(2) A person may use deadly physical force under the circumstances set forth in subsection (1) of this section only:
(a) In defense of a person as provided in ORS 161.219; or
(b) When the person reasonably believes it necessary to prevent the commission of arson or a felony by force and violence by the trespasser.
(3) As used in subsection (1) and subsection (2)(a) of this section, “premises” includes any building as defined in ORS 164.205 and any real property. As used in subsection (2)(b) of this section, “premises” includes any building. [1971 c.743 §25]
NOTE: ORS 161.225 can describe the presence of a member of a racketeering enterprise assuming the bench reserved for an administrative hearings officer presiding over the people's trafficking court in a facility controlled by the public. At such time as the professional felon solicits an armed co-conspirator disguised as a baliff or a uniformed sheriff's deputy to interfere with the administration of justice under pretext of "contempt of court", such activity may legitimately be quelled by use of any force necessary, including deadly force. But perhaps we are getting ahead of the story.
BURGLARY AND CRIMINAL TRESPASS
164.205 Definitions for ORS 164.205 to 164.270. As used in ORS 164.205 to 164.270, except as the context requires otherwise:
(1) “Building,” in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any booth, vehicle, boat, aircraft or other structure adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business therein. Where a building consists of separate units, including, but not limited to, separate apartments, offices or rented rooms, each unit is, in addition to being a part of such building, a separate building.
(2) “Dwelling” means a building which regularly or intermittently is occupied by a person lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present.
(3) “Enter or remain unlawfully” means:
(a) To enter or remain in or upon premises when the premises, at the time of such entry or remaining, are not open to the public or when the entrant is not otherwise licensed or privileged to do so;
(b) To fail to leave premises that are open to the public after being lawfully directed to do so by the person in charge;
(c) To enter premises that are open to the public after being lawfully directed not to enter the premises; or
(d) To enter or remain in a motor vehicle when the entrant is not authorized to do so.
(4) “Open to the public” means premises which by their physical nature, function, custom, usage, notice or lack thereof or other circumstances at the time would cause a reasonable person to believe that no permission to enter or remain is required.
(5) “Person in charge” means a person, a representative or employee of the person who has lawful control of premises by ownership, tenancy, official position or other legal relationship. “Person in charge” includes, but is not limited to the person, or holder of a position, designated as the person or position-holder in charge by the Governor, board, commission or governing body of any political subdivision of this state.
(6) “Premises” includes any building and any real property, whether privately or publicly owned. [1971 c.743 §135; 1983 c.740 §33; 1999 c.1040 §10; 2003 c.444 §1]
NOTE: Please do not under value the the words “but not limited to”. Bear in mind who the “Governor”, referenced in subsection (5), was “appointed” by, and therefore is “accountable to”, in the most fundamental sense of the word. Those who “appoint” the Governor are actually in control of public property.
STATE POLICE (but other law enforcement agencies as well)
181.030 Powers and duties of department and its members. (1) The Department of State Police and each member of the Oregon State Police shall be charged with the enforcement of all criminal laws.
(2) Each member of the state police is authorized and empowered to:
(a) Prevent crime.
(b) Pursue and apprehend offenders and obtain legal evidence necessary to ensure the conviction in the courts of the offenders.
(c) Institute criminal proceedings.
(d) Execute any lawful warrant or order of arrest issued against any person or persons for any violation of the law.
(e) Make arrests without warrant for violations of law in the manner provided in ORS 133.310.
(f) Give first aid to the injured.
(g) Succor the helpless.
(3) Each member of the state police shall have in general the same powers and authority as those conferred by law upon sheriffs, police officers, constables and peace officers. A member of the state police may be appointed as a deputy medical examiner.
(4) The members of the state police are subject to the call of the Governor, and are empowered to cooperate with any other instrumentality or authority of the state, or any political subdivision in detecting crime, apprehending criminals and preserving law and order throughout the state, but the state police may not be used as a posse except when ordered by the Governor. [Amended by 1961 c.434 §7; 1971 c.467 §3; 1973 c.408 §30; 1977 c.595 §1; 2009 c.11 §16]
181.400 Interference with personal and property rights of others. No member of the state police shall in any way interfere with the rights or property of any person, except for the prevention of crime, or the capture or arrest of persons committing crimes. [Amended by 1971 c.467 §25; 1991 c.145
NOTE: The term "person" is meaningless without sufficient context to describe the distinguishing characteristics common to the group to which the "person" belongs. In 181.400, the "person" who will not be interfered with at 181.400, belongs to a group of people possessed of RIGHTS, including...
801.305 “Highway.” (1) “Highway” means every public way, road, street, thoroughfare and place, including bridges, viaducts and other structures within the boundaries of this state, open,used or intended for use of the general public for vehicles or vehicular traffic as a matter of right.
...as distinct from, and in contrast with…
801.050 Privilege of motorist to use highways. Subject to compliance with the motor vehicle law of this state, owners and operators of motor vehicles are granted the privilege of using the highways of this state. [1983 c.338 §10; 1985 c.16 §8]
221.485 Policy on vehicles for hire. The Legislative Assembly finds and declares that privately owned taxicabs, limousines and other vehicles for hire are a vital part of the transportation system within this state and provide necessary services in response to the needs of state residents, tourists and business representatives from outside this state. Consequently, the safety and reliability of such vehicles and the economic well-being and stability of their owners and operators are matters of public concern. The regulation of such vehicles is an essential government function and, therefore, it is the intent of the Legislative Assembly to reaffirm the authority of political subdivisions in this state to regulate the operation of privately owned taxicabs, limousines and other vehicles for hire and to exempt such regulation from liability under federal antitrust laws. [1985 c.475 §1]
NOTE: "for hire vehicles" are elements of "the transportation system", so now you know that “transportation” is a “commercial” term. Please observe the relationship of “owners and operators” to the governmental funtions of granting privileges and regulation in 801.050 and 221.485. Feel free to use a dictionary frequently while reading these compiled statutes. .
221.495 Local franchise authority over vehicles for hire. Cities and counties in this state are authorized to grant franchises, to license, control and regulate privately owned taxicabs, limousines and other vehicles for hire that operate within their respective jurisdictions. The power to regulate granted under this section includes, but is not limited to:
(1) Regulating entry into the business of providing taxicab, limousine or other similar services.
(2) Requiring a license or permit as a condition for operation of taxicabs, limousines and other vehicles for hire and revoking, canceling or refusing to reissue a license or permit for failure to comply with regulatory requirements.
(3) Controlling the maximum rates charged and the manner in which rates are calculated and collected.
(4) Regulating routes for such vehicles, including restricting access to airports.
(5) Establishing safety, equipment and insurance requirements.
(6) Establishing any other requirements necessary to assure safe and reliable service by such vehicles. [1985 c.475 §2]
NOTE: The people, or “the general public” delegate law making functions to the Legislative Assembly, and in turn, the Legislative Assembly “authorizes” governmental subdivisions to perform certain regulatory functions consistent with the regulatory authority delegated to the Legislative Assembly’. In the section above, "privately owned", has a separate and distinct meaning from "personal use", as found below in subsection (2)(d) below.
801.208 “Commercial motor vehicle.” (1) “Commercial motor vehicle” means a motor vehicle or combination of motor vehicles that:
(a) Has a gross combination weight rating or actual gross combination weight of 26,001 pounds or more, whichever is greater, inclusive of a towed unit or a combination of towed units, with a gross vehicle weight rating or actual gross vehicle weight of more than 10,000 pounds, whichever is greater;
(b) Has a gross vehicle weight rating or actual gross combination weight of 26,001 pounds or more, whichever is greater;
(c) Is designed to transport 16 or more persons, including the driver; or
(d) Is of any size and is used in the transportation of hazardous materials.
(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, the term “commercial motor vehicle” does not include the following:
(a) An emergency fire vehicle being operated by firefighters as defined in ORS 652.050;
(b) Emergency vehicles being operated by qualified emergency service volunteers as defined in ORS 401.358;
(c) A motor home used to transport or house, for nonbusiness purposes, the operator or the operator’s family members or personal possessions; or
(d) A recreational vehicle that is operated solely for personal use. [1989 c.636 §2; 1991 c.185 §1; 1991 c.676 §1; 1999 c.359 §1; 2007 c.387 §1; 2009 c.395 §3; 2009 c.718 §27]
801.409 “Recreational vehicle.” “Recreational vehicle” has the meaning given in
ORS 446.003. [Formerly 801.407]
NOTE: Things regulated by any body of law must be defined within the regulating law, to wit, “commercial motor vehicles” are defined in the vehicle code The legal implication that "recreational vehicle" is NOT defined in the Vehicle Code, which begins with chapter 801, is that it is not subject to the Vehicle Code. Even more significantly, this reference to "solely for personal use" vehicles, is the first and last time such reference is made in the Vehicle Code, which ends with chapter 826. Please also note lack of any stated legislative intent within the Vehicle Code to regulate the “ordinary use” of the roadway, as such use is described in the following section.
801.450 “Roadway.” “Roadway” means the portion of a highway that is improved, designed or ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of the shoulder. In the event a highway includes two or more separate roadways the term “roadway” shall refer to any such roadway separately, but not to all such roadways collectively. [1983 c.338 §83]
NOTE: In former good times, the term “Roadway” was commonly used interchangeably with the term “Public Right of Way”. So who do you suppose has the right of way on the “Public Right of Way”. Certainly not those who must be licensed…
801.245 “Driver license.” “Driver license” or “license” may have any or all of the meanings provided for the terms under this section as required or appropriate under the section referring to the term. The term “driver license” may be used interchangeably with “license” and either term may be used in any or all of the following ways:
(1) It may refer to a document issued by this state or any other jurisdiction as evidence of a grant of driving privileges.
(2) It may refer to general driving privileges granted by this state or another jurisdiction. [1983 c.338 §54; 1985 c.182 §1; 1985 c.608 §2]
NOTE: The following section is included to afford the reader an opportunity to read and comprehend the meaning of the term "driver license", which means the same as "license" at (5) below, pay particular attention to the terms "title" & "registration", which are "similar forms of agency permits". Chapter 183, which now begins with section .310, is obviously the chapter that authorizes "agencies", including ODOT and DMV to act, and regulates, prescribes and circumscribes the conduct of their official duty.
EXECUTIVE BRANCH; ORGANIZATION, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT
183.310 Definitions for chapter. As used in this chapter:
(1) “Agency” means any state board, commission, department, or division thereof, or officer authorized by law to make rules or to issue orders, except those in the legislative and judicial branches.
(2)(a) “Contested case” means a proceeding before an agency:
(A) In which the individual legal rights, duties or privileges of specific parties are required by statute or Constitution to be determined only after an agency hearing at which such specific parties are entitled to appear and be heard;
(B) Where the agency has discretion to suspend or revoke a right or privilege of a person;
(C) For the suspension, revocation or refusal to renew or issue a license where the licensee or applicant for a license demands such hearing; or
(D) Where the agency by rule or order provides for hearings substantially of the character required by ORS 183.415, 183.417, 183.425, 183.450, 183.460 and 183.470.
(b) “Contested case” does not include proceedings in which an agency decision rests solely on the result of a test.
(3) “Economic effect” means the economic impact on affected businesses by and the costs of compliance, if any, with a rule for businesses, including but not limited to the costs of equipment, supplies, labor and administration.
(4) “Hearing officer” includes an administrative law judge.
(5) “License” includes the whole or part of any agency permit, certificate, approval, registration or similar form of permission required by law to pursue any commercial activity, trade, occupation or profession.
(6)(a) “Order” means any agency action expressed orally or in writing directed to a named person or named persons, other than employees, officers or members of an agency. “Order” includes any agency determination or decision issued in connection with a contested case proceeding. “Order” includes:
(A) Agency action under ORS chapter 657 making determination for purposes of unemployment compensation of employees of the state;
(B) Agency action under ORS chapter 240 which grants, denies, modifies, suspends or revokes any right or privilege of an employee of the state; and
(C) Agency action under ORS 468B.050 to issue a permit.
(b) “Final order” means final agency action expressed in writing. “Final order” does not include any tentative or preliminary agency declaration or statement that:
(A) Precedes final agency action; or
(B) Does not preclude further agency consideration of the subject matter of the statement or declaration.
(7) “Party” means:
(a) Each person or agency entitled as of right to a hearing before the agency;
(b) Each person or agency named by the agency to be a party; or
(c) Any person requesting to participate before the agency as a party or in a limited party status which the agency determines either has an interest in the outcome of the agency’s proceeding or represents a public interest in such result. The agency’s determination is subject to judicial review in the manner provided by ORS 183.482 after the agency has issued its final order in the proceedings.
(8) “Person” means any individual, partnership, corporation, association, governmental subdivision or public or private organization of any character other than an agency.
(9) “Rule” means any agency directive, standard, regulation or statement of general applicability that implements, interprets or prescribes law or policy, or describes the procedure or practice requirements of any agency.
(10) “Small business” means a corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship or other legal entity formed for the purpose of making a profit, which is independently owned and operated from all other businesses and which has 50 or fewer employees. [1957 c.717 §1; 1965 c.285 §78a; 1967 c.419 §32; 1969 c.80 §37a; 1971 c.734 §1; 1973 c.386 §4; 1973 c.621 §1a; 1977 c.374 §1; 1977 c.798 §1; 1979 c.593 §6; 1981 c.755 §1; 1987 c.320 §141; 1987 c.861 §1; 2003 c.75 §71; 2005 c.523 §8; 2007 c.288 §9]
NOTE: The language of subsections (8) and (10) above are definitive in regard to the “specific persons” who are subject to any agency hearing or regulation when taken together with Article IV, Section 20 of the Oregon Constitution. Here’s a simple illustration for purposes of clarification.
Let’s say daddy is in the business of giving haircuts. His business is “licensed” subject to certain standards, which he has agreed to meet, in order to “operate” a barber shop. Mommy cuts little Johnny’s hair, and might even use some of daddy’s professional sissors to do a nice job on their children’s hair. Because mommy does the same thing as daddy does, with his sissors, does that mean that she can be brought to court on hair cutting charges, because she doesn’t have a license? No.
Oregon Constitution at Article IV
Section 20. Subject and title of Act. Every Act shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an Act which shall not be expressed in the title, such Act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in the title.
TRAFFICKING PROCEDURE GENERALLY
153.039 Stop and detention for violation. (1) An enforcement officer may not arrest, stop or detain a person for the commission of a violation except to the extent provided in this section and ORS 810.410.
(2) An enforcement officer may stop and detain any employee, agent or representative of a firm, corporation or other organization if the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the firm, corporation or other organization has committed a violation
(3) Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, the period of detention may be only as long as is necessary to:
(a) Establish the identity of the person, firm, corporation or organization believed to have committed the violation;
(b) Conduct any investigation reasonably related to the violation; and
(c) Issue a citation for the violation.
(4) The authority of an enforcement officer to stop and detain a person for a traffic violation as defined by ORS 801.557 is governed by ORS 810.410. [1999 c.1051 §10]
810.410 Arrest and citation. (1) A police officer may arrest or issue a citation to a person for a traffic crime at any place within or outside the jurisdictional authority of the governmental unit by which the police officer is authorized to act as provided by ORS 133.235 and 133.310.
(2) A police officer may issue a citation to a person for a traffic violation at any place within or outside the jurisdictional authority of the governmental unit by which the police officer is authorized to act:
(a) When the traffic violation is committed in the police officer’s presence; or
(b) When the police officer has probable cause to believe an offense has occurred based on a description of the vehicle or other information received from a police officer who observed the traffic violation.
(3) A police officer:
(a) Shall not arrest a person for a traffic violation.
(b) May stop and detain a person for a traffic violation for the purposes of investigation reasonably related to the traffic violation, identification and issuance of citation.
(c) May make an inquiry into circumstances arising during the course of a detention and investigation under paragraph (b) of this subsection that give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
(d) May make an inquiry to ensure the safety of the officer, the person stopped or other persons present, including an inquiry regarding the presence of weapons.
(e) May request consent to search in relation to the circumstances referred to in paragraph (c) of this subsection or to search for items of evidence otherwise subject to search or seizure under ORS 133.535.
(f) May use the degree of force reasonably necessary to make the stop and ensure the safety of the peace officer, the person stopped or other persons present.
(g) May make an arrest of a person as authorized by ORS 133.310 (2) if the person is stopped and detained pursuant to the authority of this section.
(4) When a police officer at the scene of a traffic accident has reasonable grounds, based upon the police officer’s personal investigation, to believe that a person involved in the accident has committed a traffic offense in connection with the accident, the police officer may issue to the person a citation for that offense. The authority under this subsection is in addition to any other authority to issue a citation for a traffic offense. [1983 c.338 §400; 1985 c.16 §212; 1991 c.720 §1; 1995 c.308 §1; 1997 c.682 §1; 1997
c.866 §§4,5; 1999 c.1051 §89]
NOTE: Between the definitions of “person” at ORS 174.100(5), 183.310(8), and the listing of particular “persons” at 153.039 and the avoidance of any reference to “the general public” , who “ordinarily use” the roadway for vehicular travel “as a matter of right”, the reader is now sufficiently informed to start appreciating the crimes committed by individuals who, up until now, you may have thought of as “law enforcement officers”
153.083 Role of peace officer. Notwithstanding ORS 9.160 and 9.320, in any trial of a violation, whether created by ordinance or statute, in which a city attorney or district attorney does not appear, the peace officer who issued the citation for the offense may present evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses and make arguments relating to:
(1) The application of statutes and rules to the facts in the case;
(2) The literal meaning of the statutes or rules at issue in the case;
(3) The admissibility of evidence; and
(4) Proper procedures to be used in the trial. [1999 c.805 §1; 1999 c.805 §2; 2003 c.305 §1]
NOTE: Over many years of study, in trafficking courts throughout Oregon, this code talker has never seen the "judge", more precisely the administrative hearings officer allow the highlighted arguments above. The reasons that they do not, should now begin to be obvious.
162.235 Obstructing governmental or judicial administration. (1) A person commits the crime of obstructing governmental or judicial administration if the person intentionally obstructs, impairs or hinders the administration of law or other governmental or judicial function by means of intimidation, force, physical or economic interference or obstacle.
(2) This section shall not apply to the obstruction of unlawful governmental or judicial action or interference with the making of an arrest.
(3) Obstructing governmental or judicial administration is a Class A misdemeanor. [1971 c.743 §198; 1981 c.902 §1]
NOTE: How else would a reasonable human being define a trafficking court judge’s refusal to allow the “arguments” that are authorized and expected by law, as other than as an “unlawful judicial action” referenced in (2). Under this subsection, it is contemplated that the “unlawful judicial action” is something that may be “obstructed”, especially if what is unlawful is done with deliberate intent to injure another. In other words, the people, in whom all power is inherent, would be justified in using what ever force is necessary to terminate “unlawful judicial action” by an arrest of the person posing as an administrative hearings officer when he refuses to allow the arguments of the peace officer.
The first sentence of the
(law enforcement officers are sworn to support)
Section 1. Natural rights inherent in people. We declare that all men, when they form a social compact are equal in right: that all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety, and happiness; and they have at all times a right to alter, reform, or abolish the government in such manner as they may think proper.–
Back to the Oregon Revised Statutes
336.057 Courses in Constitution and history of United States. In all public schools courses of instruction shall be given in the Constitution of the United States and in the history of the United States. These courses shall:
(1) Begin not later than the opening of the eighth grade and shall continue in grades 9 through 12.
(2) Be required in all state institutions of higher education, except the Oregon Health and Science University, and in all state and local institutions that provide education for patients or inmates to an extent to be determined by the Superintendent of Public Instruction. [Formerly 336.230; 1977 c.226 §1; 1999 c.1023 §1]
336.067 Topics given special emphasis in instruction. (1) In public schools special emphasis shall be given to instruction in:
(a) Honesty, morality, courtesy, obedience to law, respect for the national flag, the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Oregon, respect for parents and the home, the dignity and necessity of honest labor and other lessons that tend to promote and develop an upright and desirable citizenry.
[Formerly 336.240; 1975 c.531 §1; 1979 c.744 §13; 1993 c.45 §75; 2005 c.209 §22]
NOTE: As of 2011, it has become so commonly understood that courses in the constitutions of the United States and the State of Oregon are NOT provided to students, as required by the preceding section, that there is no longer longer an expectation of general constitutional competence. A lack of constitutional competence is NOT a defense to falsely swearing to support the Constitutions, as legitimate law enforcement officers are each required to do upon assuming the duties of their office.
162.065 Perjury, to wit, falsely swearing an oath of office. (1) A person commits the crime of perjury if the person makes a false sworn statement in regard to a material issue, knowing it to be false.
(2) Perjury is a Class C felony. [1971 c.743 §183]
162.365 Criminal impersonation. (1) A person commits the crime of criminal impersonation if with intent to obtain a benefit, to injure or defraud another or to facilitate an unlawful activity, the person does an act in the assumed character of:
(a) A public servant; or
(b) An active member or veteran of the Armed Forces of the United States.
(2) It is no defense to a prosecution for criminal impersonation that:
(a) The office, position or title that the person pretended to hold did not in fact exist; or
(b) The unit of government that the person pretended to represent did not in fact exist.
(3)(a) Criminal impersonation is a Class A misdemeanor.
(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of this subsection, criminal impersonation is a Class C felony if the public servant impersonated is a peace officer, judge or justice of the peace. [1971 c.743 §211; 1993 c.243 §1; 1997 c.395 §2; 2003 c.577 §12; 2007 c.510 §1]
NOTE: Felons can NOT be law enforcement officers, but even those who have obviously sworn falsely, have discretion to request a trial. Where there is no question as to the performance of an otherwise criminal act, a defense may yet be raised that the peace officer, judge or justice of the peace was not competent to enough to even know what taking an oath to support the constitutions means. The plea entered in such case is: ‘Not guilty by reason of insanity”.
162.367 Criminal impersonation of peace officer. (1) A person commits the crime of criminal impersonation of a peace officer if the person, with the intent to obtain a benefit or to injure or defraud another person, uses false law enforcement identification or wears a law enforcement uniform to give the impression that the person is a peace officer and does an act in that assumed character.
(2) Criminal impersonation of a peace officer is a Class C felony.
(3) As used in this section:
(a) “False law enforcement identification” means a badge or an identification card that:
(A) Identifies the possessor of the badge or card as a member of a law enforcement unit; and
(B) Was not lawfully issued to the possessor by the law enforcement unit.
(b) “Law enforcement uniform” means clothing bearing words such as “police,” “sheriff,” “state trooper” or “law enforcement,” or clothing that is an official uniform or substantially similar to an official uniform of a law enforcement unit that would make it reasonably likely that a person would believe that the wearer is a peace officer. [1993 c.243 §2; 2005 c.259 §1]
ABUSE OF PUBLIC OFFICE
162.405 Official misconduct in the second degree. (1) A public servant commits the crime of official misconduct in the second degree if the person knowingly violates any statute relating to the office of the person.
(2) Official misconduct in the second degree is a Class C misdemeanor. [1971 c.743 §214]
162.415 Official misconduct in the first degree. (1) A public servant commits the crime of official misconduct in the first degree if with intent to obtain a benefit or to harm another:
(a) The public servant knowingly fails to perform a duty imposed upon the public servant by law or one clearly inherent in the nature of office; or
(b) The public servant knowingly performs an act constituting an unauthorized exercise in official duties.
(2) Official misconduct in the first degree is a Class A misdemeanor. [1971 c.743 §215]
NOTE: Is it a defense to the crime of "Official misconduct", that a person has falsely sworn to support the constitutions, and is therefore NOT "lawfully" a "law enforcement officer" when he or she writes "trafficking" tickets to people not described in ORS 153.039? Is the person impersonating a traffic court AHO going to be able to present a convincing argument that he too is incompetent to know what swearing an oath to support the constitutions means, when tried for denying an opportunity to present the arguments regarding the application of the statutes and rules to the facts of the case or the literal meaning of the statutes in ORS 153.083? Maybe, but there are other crimes yet to be considered. Read on.
162.355 Simulating legal process, to wit, "trafficking" tickets. (1) A person commits the crime of simulating legal process if, with the intent to harass, injure or defraud another person, the person knowingly issues or delivers to another person any document that in form and substance falsely simulates civil or criminal process.
(2) As used in this section:
(a) “Civil or criminal process” means a document or order, including, but not limited to, a summons, lien, complaint, warrant, injunction, writ, notice, pleading or subpoena, that is issued by a court or that is filed or recorded for the purpose of:
(A) Exercising jurisdiction;
(B) Representing a claim against a person or property;
(C) Directing a person to appear before a court or tribunal; or
(D) Directing a person to perform or refrain from performing a specified act.
(b) “Person” has the meaning given that term in ORS 161.015, except that in relation to a defendant, “person” means a human being, an incorporated municipality or private corporation, an unincorporated association or a partnership.
(3) Simulating legal process is a Class C felony. [1971 c.743 §210; 1997 c.395 §1; 2005 c.2 §1]
NOTE: There is more explicit language defining the “person” who is a defendant in the following section. Please notice the reference in the “legislative history”of Laws of Oregon, 1971, chapter 743 in the following section means that it is derived from the same act of the legislature as “Simulating legal process” above.
161.015 General definitions. As used in chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, and ORS 166.635, unless the context requires otherwise:
(1) “Dangerous weapon” means any weapon, device, instrument, material or substance which under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury.
(2) “Deadly weapon” means any instrument, article or substance specifically designed for and presently capable of causing death or serious physical injury.
(3) “Deadly physical force” means physical force that under the circumstances in which it is used is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury.
(4) “Peace officer” means a sheriff, constable, marshal, municipal police officer, member of the Oregon State Police, investigator of the Criminal Justice Division of the Department of Justice or investigator of a district attorney’s office and such other persons as may be designated by law.
(5) “Person” means a human being and, where appropriate, a public or private corporation, an unincorporated association, a partnership, a government or a governmental instrumentality.
(6) “Physical force” includes, but is not limited to, the use of an electrical stun gun, tear gas or mace.
(7) “Physical injury” means impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.
(8) “Serious physical injury” means physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious and protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ.
(9) “Possess” means to have physical possession or otherwise to exercise dominion or control over property.
(10) “Public place” means a place to which the general public has access and includes, but is not limited to, hallways, lobbies and other parts of apartment houses and hotels not constituting rooms or apartments designed for actual residence, and highways, streets, schools, places of amusement, parks, playgrounds and premises used in connection with public passenger transportation. [1971 c.743 §3; 1973 c.139 §1; 1979 c.656 §3; 1991 c.67 §33; 1993 c.625 §4; 1995 c.651 §5]
NOTE: Do you remember that the definitions at ORS 174.100 were to be used throughout the statutes, unless the context required otherwise? The definition section above, for purposes of the chapters describing crimes and punishment, is the only place in the Oregon Revised Statutes where the context requires that “person” be defined as “a human being”.
162.305 Tampering with public records. (1) A person commits the crime of tampering with public records if, without lawful authority, the person knowingly destroys, mutilates, conceals, removes, makes a false entry in or falsely alters any public record, including records relating to the Oregon State Lottery.
(2) tampering with public records is a Class A misdemeanor. [1971 c.743 §205; 1991 c.962 §16]
Note: Uniform "trafficking" citations are Public Records in which false entries are routinely made when such documents are issued to anyone except the "firms, corporations or other organizations" an officer is authorized to stop under 153.039, above. Not only are false entries made, but the boxes to be checked relating to essential jurisdictional elements are always ignored. An argument can be made that using the “uniform trafficking citation” to compel the attendance of those who were not engaged in trafficking at the time of the citationn to appear before an administrative tribunal is a “mutilation” or a “false alteration” of the document.
163.261 Definitions for ORS 163.263 and 163.264. As used in ORS 163.263 and 163.264, “services” means activities performed by one person under the supervision or for the benefit of another person. [2007 c.811 §1]
163.263 Subjecting another person to involuntary servitude in the second degree. (1) A person commits the crime of subjecting another person to involuntary servitude in the second degree if the person knowingly and without lawful authority forces or attempts to force the other person to engage in services by:
(a) Abusing or threatening to abuse the law or legal process;
(b) Destroying, concealing, removing, confiscating or possessing an actual or purported passport or immigration document or another actual or purported government identification document of a person;
(c) Threatening to report a person to a government agency for the purpose of arrest or deportation;
(d) Threatening to collect an unlawful debt; or
(e) Instilling in the other person a fear that the actor will withhold from the other person the necessities of life, including but not limited to lodging, food and clothing.
(2) Subjecting another person to involuntary servitude in the second degree is a Class C felony. [2007 c.811 §3]
NOTE: When a person is compelled to labor for money to pay fines associated with the imposition of judgment in connection with a “trafficking violation” or misdemeanor trafficking offense, he or she is the victim of the crime of “involuntary servitude”, unless he or she was actually a “motor vehicle operater”, on the job, and stopped by a truly sworn law enforcement officer. Many people who can not afford to be robbed, are compelled to take classes of one sort or another, which also require fees, but not as much money as the fine would have been. The threats to compel compliance consist, in part, of taking the “purported government identification document”/bogus driver license away if the fines are not paid or the classes attended.
163.264 Subjecting another person to involuntary servitude in the first degree. (1) A person commits the crime of subjecting another person to involuntary servitude in the first degree if the person knowingly and without lawful authority forces or attempts to force the other person to engage in services by:
(a) Causing or threatening to cause the death of or serious physical injury to a person; or
(b) Physically restraining or threatening to physically restrain a person.
(2) Subjecting another person to involuntary servitude in the first degree is a
Class B felony. [2007 c.811 §2]
NOTE: When you observe someone in your rearview mirror who is armed and trained in the use of lethal force, turn the flashing emergency lights on in their vehicle, ask yourself, do you feel “physically restrained”, and therefore acquiesce to the “simulated legal process” which will force you to relinquish the fruits of your labor to another?
163.266 Trafficking in persons. (1) A person commits the crime of trafficking in persons if the person knowingly:
(a) Recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides or obtains by any means, or attempts to recruit, entice, harbor, transport, provide or obtain by any means, another person knowing that the other person will be subjected to involuntary servitude as described in ORS 163.263 or 163.264; or
(b) Benefits financially or receives something of value from participation in a venture that involves an act prohibited by this section or ORS 163.263 or 163.264.
(2) Trafficking in persons is a Class B felony. [2007 c.811 §4]
NOTE: Upon “simulated” conviction of a member of the general public in a "trafficking" court, the victim frequently finds herself obligated to "payment plans", increased insurance rates, classes and or testing, all of which are supervised by, or are for the benefit of another, see 163.261 above; the so called law enforcement officer knows this and; he collects 25% of the base fine amount for the jurisdiction that employs him.
163.275 Coercion. (1) A person commits the crime of coercion when the person compels or induces another person to engage in conduct from which the other person has a legal right to abstain, or to abstain from engaging in conduct in which the other person has a legal right to engage, by means of instilling in the other person a fear that, if the other person refrains from the conduct compelled or induced or engages in conduct contrary to the compulsion or inducement, the actor or another will:
(a) Unlawfully cause physical injury to some person;
(b) Unlawfully cause damage to property;
(c) Engage in conduct constituting a crime;
(d) Falsely accuse some person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against the person;
(e) Cause or continue a strike, boycott or other collective action injurious to some person’s business, except that such a threat is not deemed coercive when the act or omission compelled is for the benefit of the group in whose interest the actor purports to act;
(f) Testify falsely or provide false information or withhold testimony or information with respect to another’s legal claim or defense; or
(g) Unlawfully use or abuse the person’s position as a public servant by performing some act within or related to official duties, or by failing or refusing to perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect some person adversely.
(2) Coercion is a Class C felony. [1971 c.743 §102; 1983 c.546 §4; 1985 c.338 §1; 2007 c.71 §45]
NOTE: Although trafficking violations are NOT crimes, they are prosecuted pursuant to “Crimimal procedure” pursuant to…
153.030 Applicability; statute of limitations. (1) The procedures provided for in this chapter apply to violations described in ORS 153.008. Except as specifically provided in this chapter, the criminal procedure laws of this state applicable to crimes also apply to violations.
(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, the procedures described in this chapter and in the criminal procedure laws of this state do not apply to violations that govern the parking of vehicles and that are created by ordinance or by agency rule.
(3) The statute of limitations for proceedings under this chapter is as provided in ORS 131.125.
(4) This chapter does not affect the ability of a city described in ORS 3.136 (1) to engage in the activities described in ORS 3.136 (3). Nothing in this chapter affects the ability of any other political subdivision of this state to provide for the administrative enforcement of the charter, ordinances, rules and regulations of the political subdivision, including enforcement through imposition of monetary penalties. Except for ordinances governing the parking of vehicles, administrative enforcement as described in this subsection may not be used for any prohibition designated as an offense.
(5) Nothing in this chapter affects the ability of any political subdivision of this state to establish rules relating to administrative enforcement for initiating administrative enforcement proceedings. as described in subsection (4) of this section, including rules providing for the use of citations or other procedures
(6) Nothing in this chapter affects the ability of any political subdivision of this state to conduct hearings for administrative enforcement as described in subsection (4) of this section, either before a hearing officer or before the governing body of the political subdivision.
(7) Nothing in this chapter affects the ability of any political subdivision to bring a civil action to enforce the charter, ordinances, rules and regulations of the political subdivision, or to bring a civil action to enforce any order for administrative enforcement as described in subsection (4) of this section.
(8) Nothing in ORS 153.042 affects the authority of any political subdivision of this state to provide for issuance of citations for violation of offenses created by ordinance on the same basis as the political subdivision could under the law in effect immediately before January 1, 2000. [1999 c.1051 §7]
164.075 Theft by extortion. (1) A person commits theft by extortion when the person compels or induces another to deliver property to the person or to a third person by instilling in the other a fear that, if the property is not so delivered, the actor or a third person will in the future:
(a) Cause physical injury to some person;
(b) Cause damage to property;
(c) Engage in other conduct constituting a crime;
(d) Accuse some person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against the person;
(e) Expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject some person to hatred, contempt or ridicule;
(f) Cause or continue a strike, boycott or other collective action injurious to some person’s business, except that such conduct is not considered extortion when the property is demanded or received for the benefit of the group in whose interest the actor purports to act;
(g) Testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information with respect to another’s legal claim or defense;
(h) Use or abuse the position as a public servant by performing some act within or related to official duties, or by failing or refusing to perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect some person adversely; or
(i) Inflict any other harm that would not benefit the actor.
(2) Theft by extortion is a Class B felony. [1971 c.743 §127; 1987 c.158 §27; 2007 c.71 §48]
164.085 Theft by deception, the normal course in trafficking court proceedings.
(1) A person, who obtains property of another thereby, commits theft by deception when, with intent to defraud, the person:
(a) Creates or confirms another’s false impression of law, value, intention or other state of mind that the actor does not believe to be true;
(b) Fails to correct a false impression that the person previously created or confirmed;
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information pertinent to the disposition of the property involved;
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property, failing to disclose a lien, adverse claim or other legal impediment to the enjoyment of the property, whether such impediment is or is not valid, or is or is not a matter of official record; or
(e) Promises performance that the person does not intend to perform or knows will not be performed.
(2) “Deception” does not include falsity as to matters having no pecuniary significance, or representations unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. For purposes of this subsection, the theft of a companion animal, as defined in ORS 164.055, or a captive wild animal is a matter having pecuniary significance. [1971 c.743 §128; 1991 c.837 §10; 2007 c.71 §49]
NOTE: Theft by deception is what goes on in traffic court every day, and encumbering solely for personal use vehicles by having them towed without due process of law is what pseudo "law enforcement officers" frequently do before even getting to "trafficking" court.
164.095 Theft by receiving, to wit, towing company in collusion with trafficking officer. (1) A person commits theft by receiving if the person receives, retains, conceals or disposes of property of another knowing or having good reason to know that the property was the subject of theft.
164.015 “Theft” described. A person commits theft when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate property to the person or to a third person, the person:
(1) Takes, appropriates, obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof;
(2) Commits theft of property lost, mislaid or delivered by mistake as provided in ORS 164.065;
(3) Commits theft by extortion as provided in ORS 164.075;
(4) Commits theft by deception as provided in ORS 164.085; or
(5) Commits theft by receiving as provided in ORS 164.095. [1971 c.743 §123; 2007 c.71 §47]
164.055 Theft in the first degree. (1) A person commits the crime of theft in the first degree if, by means other than extortion, the person commits theft as defined in ORS 164.015 and:
(a) The total value of the property in a single or aggregate transaction is $1,000 or more;
(3) Theft in the first degree is a Class C felony. [1971 c.743 §125; 1973 c.405 §1; 1983 c.740 §32; 1987 c.907 §4; 1991 c.837 §9; 1993 c.252 §5; 1993 c.680 §20; 2005 c.706 §10; 2009 c.16 §3; 2009 c.610 §6]
164.135 Unauthorized use of a vehicle. (1) A person commits the crime of unauthorized use of a vehicle when:
(a) The person takes, operates, exercises control over, rides in or otherwise uses another’s vehicle, boat or aircraft without consent of the owner;
(2) Unauthorized use of a vehicle, boat or aircraft is a Class C felony. [1971 c.743 §134; 2001 c.851 §1; 2007 c.71 §50]
164.395 Robbery in the third degree. (1) A person commits the crime of robbery in the third degree if in the course of committing or attempting to commit theft or unauthorized use of a vehicle as defined in ORS 164.135 the person uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force upon another person with the intent of:
(a) Preventing or overcoming resistance to the taking of the property or to retention thereof immediately after the taking; or
(b) Compelling the owner of such property or another person to deliver the property or to engage in other conduct which might aid in the commission of the theft or unauthorized use of a vehicle.
(2) Robbery in the third degree is a Class C felony. [1971 c.743 §148; 2003 c.357 §1]
164.405 Robbery in the second degree. (1) A person commits the crime of robbery in the second degree if the person violates ORS 164.395 and the person:
(a) Represents by word or conduct that the person is armed with what purports to be a dangerous or deadly weapon; or
(b) Is aided by another person actually present.
(2) Robbery in the second degree is a Class B felony. [1971 c.743 §149]
164.415 Robbery in the first degree. (1) A person commits the crime of robbery in the first degree if the person violates ORS 164.395 and the person:
(a) Is armed with a deadly weapon;
(b) Uses or attempts to use a dangerous weapon; or
(c) Causes or attempts to cause serious physical injury to any person.
(2) Robbery in the first degree is a Class A felony. [1971 c.743 §150; 2007 c.71 §51]
NOTE: Pseudo law enforcement officers routinely engage in the various degrees of Robbery above, when interferring with the rights of citizens to use the highway, on nothing more than a pretext of paperwork “violations” that are legally applicable to “any employee, agent or representative of a firm, corporation or other organization. Does the reader realize that a “Class A felony” is punishable by imprisonment for a period of up to 30 years?
166.025 Disorderly conduct in the second degree. (1) A person commits the crime of disorderly conduct in the second degree if, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, the person:
(a) Engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior;
(b) Makes unreasonable noise;
(c) Disturbs any lawful assembly of persons without lawful authority;
(d) Obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic on a public way;
(e) Congregates with other persons in a public place and refuses to comply with a lawful order of the police to disperse;
(f) Initiates or circulates a report, knowing it to be false, concerning an alleged or impending fire, explosion, crime, catastrophe or other emergency; or
(g) Creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which the person is not licensed or privileged to do.
(2) Disorderly conduct in the second degree is a Class B misdemeanor. [1971 c.743 §220; 1983 c.546 §5; 2001 c.104 §55; 2005 c.631 §1]
NOTE: Pseudo law enforcement officers routinely employ sirens and display “emergency” flashing lights in the course of interferring with the right of the pubic to use the Public Right of Way, without the slightest hint of an actual emergency, OR authority to do so.
NOTE: The essence of “racketeering” is a PATTERN of criminal conduct having a common nexus. This nexus can appear in a multiplicity of patterns. Having reviewed the preceding compilation of statutes you have now been sensitized to but one pattern of racketeeringt activity, having as its nexus an unmitigated desire to control and exploit not only the traveling public, but to overtly enslave (to actually make people pay if they want to get up and move somewhere else by vehicle) an entire society, in order to generate corporate profits for shippers and haulers for hire.
You have just reviewed a pattern that spreads across officers of the judicial branch of government, to the executive branch wherein agency directors wield the police powers of the state. As of October 19, 2009, ODOT’s Director, Matthew Garrett, went on the public record, asking the Oregon Transportation Commisssioners to not even consider a proposed administrative rule that might implement agency “authority” to “Optionally Title and Register” vehicles belonging to the class of people designated “the general public”. This legislative authority had been requested by DMV Director David P. Moomaw, and enacted into law by former Senator, Jane Cease of Northeast Portland, who subsequently became the next DMV Director (see current ORS 803.035 through 803.040 and 803.310).
As of the legislative session of 2011, Legislative Cousel, Dexter Johnson has demonstrated his knowing and willful intent to join with others in the criminal enterprise, fabricating a “legal excuse” for not having to move to correct certain “legal misperceptions” held by his client legislators, some of whom are not as ignorant as others. Not one legislator during the 2011 legislative session was capable, or perhaps willing, to call Legislative Counsel to account, in regard to his frivolous assertion that he does not have to reveal racketeering activity to the Legislative Assembly so that they may be empowered to exert their legislative powers to secure remedy for their constituents.
Perhaps the convention of highlighting important phrases in the foregoing statutes should be carried through to the end of this piece. However, in thinking about how to most effectively convey this information, this code talker realized the value of encouraging the reader to review, and thereby retain a picture of the pattern illustrated above. Recommendation is therefore made to go through the comprehensive listing of possible criminal patterns that follow in the section below, and highlight the ones that define the crimes that cops commit when they act in concert with others to extract money through inappropriate enforcement of motor vehicle laws.
The racketeering statues slice broad and deep at any criminal enterprise. They are on the books as an expression of legislative concern that has long been hidden from the consciousness of the people.
166.715 Definitions for ORS 166.715 to 166.735. As used in ORS 166.715 to 166.735, unless the context requires otherwise:
(1) “Documentary material” means any book, paper, document, writing, drawing, graph, chart, photograph, phonograph record, magnetic tape, computer printout, other data compilation from which information can be obtained or from which information can be translated into usable form, or other tangible item.
(2) “Enterprise” includes any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust or other profit or nonprofit legal entity, and includes any union, association or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, and both illicit and licit enterprises and governmental and nongovernmental entities.
(3) “Investigative agency” means the Department of Justice or any district attorney.
(4) “Pattern of racketeering activity” means engaging in at least two incidents of racketeering activity that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims or methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics, including a nexus to the same enterprise, and are not isolated incidents, provided at least one of such incidents occurred after November 1, 1981, and that the last of such incidents occurred within five years after a prior incident of racketeering activity. Notwithstanding ORS 131.505 to 131.525 or 419A.190 or any other provision of law providing that a previous prosecution is a bar to a subsequent prosecution, conduct that constitutes an incident of racketeering activity may be used to establish a pattern of racketeering activity without regard to whether the conduct previously has been the subject of a criminal prosecution or conviction or a juvenile court adjudication, unless the prosecution resulted in an acquittal or the adjudication resulted in entry of an order finding the youth not to be within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
(5) “Person” means any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in real or personal property.
(6) “Racketeering activity” includes conduct of a person committed both before and after the person attains the age of 18 years, and means to commit, to attempt to commit, to conspire to commit, or to solicit, coerce or intimidate another person to commit:
(a) Any conduct that constitutes a crime, as defined in ORS 161.515, under any of the following provisions of the Oregon Revised Statutes:
(A) ORS 59.005 to 59.451, 59.710 to 59.830, 59.991 and 59.995, relating to securities;
(B) ORS 162.015, 162.025 and 162.065 to 162.085, relating to bribery and perjury;
(C) ORS 162.235, 162.265 to 162.305, 162.325, 162.335, 162.355 and 162.365, relating to obstructing governmental administration;
(D) ORS 162.405 to 162.425, relating to abuse of public office;
(E) ORS 162.455, relating to interference with legislative operation;
(F) ORS 163.095 to 163.115, 163.118, 163.125 and 163.145, relating to criminal homicide;
(G) ORS 163.160 to 163.205, relating to assault and related offenses;
(H) ORS 163.225 and 163.235, relating to kidnapping;
(I) ORS 163.275, relating to coercion;
(J) ORS 163.670 to 163.693, relating to sexual conduct of children;
(K) ORS 164.015, 164.043, 164.045, 164.055, 164.057, 164.075 to 164.095, 164.098, 164.125, 164.135, 164.140, 164.215, 164.225 and 164.245 to 164.270, relating to theft, burglary, criminal trespass and related offenses;
(L) ORS 164.315 to 164.335, relating to arson and related offenses;
(M) ORS 164.345 to 164.365, relating to criminal mischief;
(N) ORS 164.395 to 164.415, relating to robbery;
(O) ORS 164.865, 164.875 and 164.868 to 164.872, relating to unlawful recording or labeling of a recording;
(P) ORS 165.007 to 165.022, 165.032 to 165.042 and 165.055 to 165.070, relating to forgery and related offenses;
(Q) ORS 165.080 to 165.109, relating to business and commercial offenses;
(R) ORS 165.485 to 165.515, 165.540 and 165.555, relating to communication crimes;
(S) ORS 166.180, 166.190, 166.220, 166.250, 166.270, 166.275, 166.410, 166.450 and 166.470, relating to firearms and other weapons;
(T) ORS 164.377 (2) to (4), as punishable under ORS 164.377 (5)(b), 167.007 to 167.017, 167.054, 167.057, 167.062 to 167.080, 167.090, 167.122 to 167.137, 167.147, 167.164, 167.167, 167.212, 167.355, 167.365, 167.370, 167.428, 167.431 and 167.439, relating to prostitution, obscenity, sexually explicit material, sexual conduct, gambling, computer crimes involving the Oregon State Lottery, animal fighting, forcible recovery of a fighting bird and related offenses;
(U) ORS 171.990, relating to legislative witnesses;
(V) ORS 260.575 and 260.665, relating to election offenses;
(W) ORS 314.075, relating to income tax;
(X) ORS 180.440 (2) and 180.486 (2) and ORS chapter 323, relating to cigarette and tobacco products taxes and the directories developed under ORS 180.425 and 180.477;
(Y) ORS 411.630, 411.675, 411.690 and 411.840, relating to public assistance payments, and ORS 411.990 (2) and (3);
(Z) ORS 462.140, 462.415 and 462.420 to 462.520, relating to racing;
(AA) ORS 463.995, relating to boxing, mixed martial arts and entertainment wrestling, as defined in ORS 463.015;
(BB) ORS 471.305, 471.360, 471.392 to 471.400, 471.403, 471.404, 471.405, 471.425, 471.442, 471.445, 471.446, 471.485, 471.490 and 471.675, relating to alcoholic liquor, and any of the provisions of ORS chapter 471 relating to licenses issued under the Liquor Control Act;
(CC) ORS 475.005 to 475.285 and 475.840 to 475.980, relating to controlled substances;
(DD) ORS 480.070, 480.210, 480.215, 480.235 and 480.265, relating to explosives;
(EE) ORS 819.010, 819.040, 822.100, 822.135 and 822.150, relating to motor vehicles;
(FF) ORS 658.452 or 658.991 (2) to (4), relating to farm labor contractors;
(GG) ORS chapter 706, relating to banking law administration;
(HH) ORS chapter 714, relating to branch banking;
(II) ORS chapter 716, relating to mutual savings banks;
(JJ) ORS chapter 723, relating to credit unions;
(KK) ORS chapter 726, relating to pawnbrokers;
(LL) ORS 166.382 and 166.384, relating to destructive devices;
(MM) ORS 165.074;
(NN) ORS 86A.095 to 86A.198, relating to mortgage bankers and mortgage brokers;
(OO) ORS chapter 496, 497 or 498, relating to wildlife;
(PP) ORS 163.355 to 163.427, relating to sexual offenses;
(QQ) ORS 166.015, relating to riot;
(RR) ORS 166.155 and 166.165, relating to intimidation;
(SS) ORS chapter 696, relating to real estate and escrow;
(TT) ORS chapter 704, relating to outfitters and guides;
(UU) ORS 165.692, relating to making a false claim for health care payment;
(VV) ORS 162.117, relating to public investment fraud;
(WW) ORS 164.170 or 164.172;
(XX) ORS 647.140, 647.145 or 647.150, relating to trademark counterfeiting;
(YY) ORS 164.886;
(ZZ) ORS 167.312 and 167.388;
(AAA) ORS 164.889;
(BBB) ORS 165.800; or
(CCC) ORS 163.263, 163.264 or 163.266.
(b) Any conduct defined as “racketeering activity” under 18 U.S.C. 1961 (1)(B), (C), (D) and (E).
(7) “Unlawful debt” means any money or other thing of value constituting principal or interest of a debt that is legally unenforceable in the state in whole or in part because the debt was incurred or contracted:
(a) In violation of any one of the following:
(A) ORS chapter 462, relating to racing;
(B) ORS 167.108 to 167.164, relating to gambling; or
(C) ORS 82.010 to 82.170, relating to interest and usury.
(b) In gambling activity in violation of federal law or in the business of lending money at a rate usurious under federal or state law.
(8) Notwithstanding contrary provisions in ORS 174.060, when this section references a statute in the Oregon Revised Statutes that is substantially different in the nature of its essential provisions from what the statute was when this section was enacted, the reference shall extend to and include amendments to the statute. [1981 c.769 §2; 1983 c.338 §898; 1983 c.715 §1; 1985 c.176 §5; 1985 c.557 §8; 1987 c.158 §31; 1987 c.249 §7; 1987 c.789 §20; 1987 c.907 §12; 1989 c.384 §2; 1989 c.839 §27; 1989 c.846 §13; 1989 c.982 §6; 1991 c.398 §3; 1991 c.962 §6; 1993 c.95 §13; 1993 c.215 §1; 1993 c.508 §45; 1993 c.680 §29; 1995 c.301 §35; 1995 c.440 §13; 1995 c.768 §10; 1997 c.631 §420; 1997 c.789 §1; 1997 c.867 §23; 1999 c.722 §8; 1999 c.878 §4; 2001 c.146 §1; 2001 c.147 §3; 2003 c.111 §1; 2003 c.484 §8; 2003 c.801 §15; 2003 c.804 §66; 2007 c.498 §3; 2007 c.585 §26; 2007 c.811 §7; 2007 c.869 §7; 2009 c.717 §25]
NOTE: Even crimes that are described as misdemeanors, for example “Official misconduct” in the first and second degree, if exhibited in the context of a “pattern” of conduct constituting racketeering, become Class A felonies subject to subsections (1) through (4) below.
166.720 Racketeering activity unlawful; penalties. (1) It is unlawful for any person who has knowingly received any proceeds derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through the collection of an unlawful debt to use or invest, whether directly or indirectly, any part of such proceeds, or the proceeds derived from the investment or use thereof, in the acquisition of any title to, or any right, interest or equity in, real property or in the establishment or operation of any enterprise.
(2) It is unlawful for any person, through a pattern of racketeering activity or through the collection of an unlawful debt, to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any real property or enterprise.
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by, or associated with, any enterprise to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt.
(4) It is unlawful for any person to conspire or endeavor to violate any of the provisions of subsections (1), (2) or (3) of this section.
(5)(a) Any person convicted of engaging in activity in violation of the provisions of subsections (1) to (4) of this section is guilty of a Class A felony.
(b) In lieu of a fine otherwise authorized by law, any person convicted of engaging in conduct in violation of the provisions of subsections (1) to (4) of this section, through which the person derived a pecuniary value, or by which the person caused personal injury or property damage or other loss, may be sentenced to pay a fine that does not exceed three times the gross value gained or three times the gross loss caused, whichever is greater, plus court costs and the costs of investigation and prosecution, reasonably incurred.
(c) The court shall hold a hearing to determine the amount of the fine authorized by paragraph (b) of this subsection.
(d) For the purposes of paragraph (b) of this subsection, “pecuniary value” means:
(A) Anything of value in the form of money, a negotiable instrument, a commercial interest or anything else the primary significance of which is economic advantage; or
(B) Any other property or service that has a value in excess of $100.
(6) An allegation of a pattern of racketeering activity is sufficient if it contains substantially the following:
(a) A statement of the acts constituting each incident of racketeering activity in ordinary and concise language, and in a manner that enables a person of common understanding to know what is intended;
(b) A statement of the relation to each incident of racketeering activity that the conduct was committed on or about a designated date, or during a designated period of time;
(c) A statement, in the language of ORS 166.715 (4) or other ordinary and concise language, designating which distinguishing characteristic or characteristics interrelate the incidents of racketeering activity; and
(d) A statement that the incidents alleged were not isolated. [1981 c.769 §§3,4; 1997 c.789 §2]
Responsible people do what they can to prevent or stop crime. For anyone to fail to act when possessed of knowledge that a crime has been committed is to condone, allow, facilitate and to become an accessory to the crime and incur criminal liability as such. The criminal “suspects” do not look forward to the day that 3,4 or a half dozen responsible people all decide, at the same time, that they will do the right thing, rather than to be the victims of a criminal enterprise. Imagine how this prospect might make you feel if you knew that any given day you went to work might be your last day out side of a prison cell. Imagine the stench of corruption that you would be breathing with each breath, that drove you back to your job as a professional criminal every day.
Now you know why police officers and traffic court judges are so stern, if not overtly hostile. They are facing very long prison sentences whenever the people decide to do the right thing and begin arresting them so they can have a fair trial.
In this code talker’s effort’s to bring information of rackeeteering to the attention of the proper authorities, reinforcements were not always readily available. At this time, recruiting, screening, and training of those who are willing to act responsiblly are prioritized, in that order, until further notice.
Being a responsible “people” is the art of not only knowing right from wrong, but doing what it takes to deter harm, even in the face of personal risk, and going on to live the good life possessed of the satisfaction of having done it. We have been encouraged to think of having a “good life” in terms of what our compliant victimhood can afford us… What? “Security”, avoidance of further abuse? A friend of mine, who slept with a slave, said the people are inclined to be long suffering… Thomas Jefferson also said that when the people fear government, there will be tyranny but when governmant fears the people we will have freedom. We must all suffer until we realize that the land of the free and the home of the brave is being destroyed by our own complicity. Well, that’s not quite right, our willingness to be compliant victims enriches and empowers the corproradoes who retain the services of cops who commit all the crimes listed here. They probably feel quite liberated by the fruits of their criminal enterprise.
Read this compilation again. Read you state’s constitution. Learn the law. Realize that you are responsible, one way or the other. Talk some code with your neighbors. Do not think you can reach out for a dream of freedom, and the object of your longing will light gently on your hand. You must come to know with absolute certainly that freedom will be within the fist you clench when, and only if, you will your fingers to curl around it. It is not an act of God that you wait paitiently for, knowing that if he doesn’t get to it in this lifetime, things will be better in heaven. Becoming responsible to end your own victimization is distinctly your own ACT OF WILL, an expression of your divine manifestation, animated by compassion.
If you can appreciate the moment of hesitance before the bold stroke, you can write to this code talker at: richardl.koenig@gmail .com , please use the ORS reference number for “Use of force, generally” at “ORS 161.205” in the subject line. For more related information search the web for Richard L. Koenig.
May God Bless us everyone,
Richard L. Koenig.